The regulation of conduct via law is a key mechanism through which broader social meanings are negotiated and expressed. 
also interact in problematic ways, creating conflicts of rationality that pose functional and procedural challenges for regulators, who are pulled in multiple directions by these needs, able to satisfy some but not all of them.
As the remainder of this paper will demonstrate, the concept of 'risk-based inspection' has been interpreted in different ways at different times in response to the shifting balance of the three drivers identified by Baldwin and Black (theoretical, operational, and political: 2016) . On the one hand, this has been a case of regulatory practices expressing the prevailing external contextual pressures that act upon them as a form of direct, proactive meaning-construction, framing risk-based inspection in different ways in order to reassert the core values that underpin this area of regulatory practice. Inspection is able to serve as an expressive indicator of political priority (Hutter & Manning 1990; Walters et al. 2011: ch.8 On the other hand, however, the changing definition and use of risk-based inspection is also a result of regulators choosing to utilise this concept reactively, in response to the external pressures they face, as a means of showing their conformity to a broader 'orthodoxy of meaning' which valorises the values that this regulatory tool is seen to embody. Being 'risk-based' is an effective means of demonstrating a response to those pressures because it resonates with the values that Governmental policy actors in the United Kingdom have repeatedly endorsed, namely, that public preferences and interests are actually best served via a conception of the regulatory 'good' that is avowedly economically rational in nature (Almond 2015 
Methodology
A mixed-methodology approach was utilised to gather a historical overview of the way that the legitimacy of health and safety has changed in the UK over the last 60 years. In order to generate original insights into historical processes, semi-structured oral history interviews were undertaken (n=40) during 2014-15 with key actors from the recent history of health and safety, recruited purposively due to their specific contribution, reputation, and role within the field. The range of interviewees was balanced to ensure that multiple constituencies (regulators, policymakers, trade unions, safety professions, and employers) were represented. They were conducted 'on-the-record', audio-recorded and then transcribed so as to render them as oral history documents; these transcripts were subject to analysis via an iterative process of descriptive coding. Interviewees were given significant scope to self-direct their contributions within the context of a framework of prepared questions and issues for discussion. 1 In order to contextualise this data, and offset any possible tendency for 1 All but two interviewees gave their consent to be interviewed 'on the record', however, to improve accessibility, when interviews are referenced in the text, they are identified in parentheses via a interviewees to exert bias in their recollections, a wide range of historical, archival, and written documentary sources were also surveyed and analysed. Although some documents have not survived, and others under 30 years old are subject to access restrictions, materials produced by state bodies, trades unions, employers' organizations, workers, the media, and non-governmental organizations, were obtained. Documents were initially sampled by availability to gain a broad overview, followed by more concentrated investigation of areas that emerged as being of particular importance.
The First Frame: Risk and Expertise
The inspection of premises to share expertise with, and provide specialized support to, regulated firms, was central to the relational, knowledge-centric pre-Robens regulatory system:
"Our district inspector…[had] a thirst for knowledge. Over and over again, he'd ring me up and say 'is it all right if we come down to the works? I'm not here inspecting, I just want to see that particular plant'." (Steel Industry Safety
Professional, 1950s-1990s: para.14)
Similarly, former Factory Inspectors recalled the day-to-day process of visiting the premises on their 'beat', and getting a feel for the risks present: Factories, 1970s-1990s: para.8; also HSE Chief Inspector of Factories, 1980s-2000s: para.25) Inspection was a tool of regulatory 'craft' (Sparrow 2000), underpinned by finegrained expertise derived from frontline experience, and deployed within relationships based on goodwill, but the Factory Inspectorate lacked the resources needed to be able to claim completeness of coverage (DEP 1968: xi) . The expansion of the regulated sphere to include non-factory workplaces during the 1960s and 1970s meant selectivity was required, usually on the basis of company size and sector (Rhodes 1981: 85) , but wedded to a standardized inspection programme:
descriptor of the interviewee's most relevant role, the time period when they were active, and the relevant paragraph in the interview transcript. towards universal coverage are set aside in favour of a more individualized and rationalized set of guiding assumptions (Almond 2015: 221) . The most distinctive contribution made by the risk-tolerant frame has been to harness the definition and measurement of risk to the making of categorical value judgements about where inspection ought to occur. While Government rhetoric has framed this process in ideological terms as a battle against 'red tape', the use of inspection as a 'risktolerant' measure has been equally important in establishing the new orthodoxy of regulatory intervention as something which is legitimately confined to a narrow range of 'deserving' duty-holders.
Conclusions
Over the last fifty years, health and safety inspection policy in the UK has shifted towards the pursuit of new goals of devolved responsibility, risk-based targeting, and efficiency gains, and there has been a move away from generalist inspection. A new 'orthodoxy of meaning' around inspection has emerged, which has established the use of this tool as exceptional, and subject to assessment as 'inefficient' and 'ineffective' according to the prevailing framework for value judgement. The changing notions of 'risk-based' regulation, sketched here, have each contributed to a process of 'reregulation of social meaning' (Lessig 1995), embodying in turn values of expertise, efficiency, effectiveness, and exceptionalism. This has culminated in a risk-tolerant dynamic, which uses the logic of risk-based decision-making to draw wide-ranging, categorical differences between areas where inspection is and is not suitable or deserved, and which sees inspection increasingly as a subject of marketbased decision-making. Cumulatively, this has led to the development of a new orthodoxy around inspection, dominated by economic rationality and the consideration of efficiency to the exclusion of other criteria. The balance between instrumental and symbolic uses of inspection identified by Hutter (1986) has been settled in favour of instrumentalism, and the contested political climate has led to a narrower conception of where, when and how inspection should be used.
In essence, risk-based regulation has meant different things at different times, as dictated by changing political circumstances and evolving normative conceptions of legitimacy; from being contingent on the way that inspection is done, or factors internal to the process itself, to being contingent upon the way that inspection is measured, or factors external to the process. Inspection, as a tool, has increasingly been evaluated according to an economic rationality imported from elsewhere in government, and has largely been found wanting on those terms. This has happened alongside a narrowing of the parameters of the regulatory state more generally, away from values of interventionism, universalism, and generality, and towards individualism, rationalization, and decentring (Almond 2015) , so that the two tendencies are mutually reinforcing. On the one hand, inspection is a top-down, invasive tool that is difficult to reconcile with the values of this new regulatory reality, and risk-based approaches have offered a means of achieving this by placing it on a targeted, 'efficiency-centric' footing. On the other, risk-based practice has provided the 'good reasons' for this change of regulatory reality, being utilised to establish an underpinning commitment to economic decision-making as the cornerstones of a new 'orthodoxy of meaning' around regulation. In this way, regulatory inspection, as a process of expressive law-formation, comes to embody and entrench prevailing political values that privilege an economic view of regulation. While previous literature has tended to conceive of the incorporation of social values into regulatory processes as a potential counterweight to economic-oriented orthodoxies (Lessig 1996) , this investigation has demonstrated that processes of regulatory meaningconstruction are particularly adept at producing outcomes that mirror, rather than challenge, the prevailing political climate of the day. The most significant implication of the redefinition of the meaning of 'risk-based' inspection sketched out in this paper, has been the tendency for this term to be utilised explicitly as a means of making normative choices about how far regulation should go. Rather than making reference to matters of expertise, efficiency, and effectiveness, however they may be evaluated, the focus has moved towards preferential value-judgements about the weighing of risk within a broader political framework. In this sense, while the procedural legitimatory norms that justified riskbased approaches (accountability, efficiency, legality : Baldwin 1995) were, in the past, politically chosen as values to pursue within public administration, the focus of this choice has increasingly shifted to the selection of the outcomes and ends that are sought, rather than the means by which they are achieved. 'Better regulation' has thus been supplanted as the essentially neutral aim of political action, and now functions as a means of achieving a broader set of political aims, namely, the redrawing of the "sometimes fragile balance between the interests of economic activity on the one hand and the public welfare on the other" (Hawkins 1984: 9) . As contemporary regulatory states face up to an era of increasing challenge from political actors over the ends and goals they are seen to represent, it becomes increasingly important to acknowledge the permeability of regulatory concepts to broader political influences and social values. They must be understood not just as the outcomes of political processes, but also as tools and mechanisms through which those political processes are enacted, expressed, and entrenched.
